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MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

MITRE ATT&CK techniques represent the “how” of an attack - the specific methods adversaries use to accomplish their tactical goals. This section provides detailed analysis of key techniques with AlertKick detection methods and mitigation strategies.

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems.

# eBPF security rule for phishing detection
- rule: Phishing Email Detected
desc: Detect suspicious email activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "thunderbird" or proc.name = "outlook" or proc.name = "mail") and
(proc.cmdline contains "suspicious_sender" or proc.cmdline contains "malicious_link")
output: >
Phishing email detected
(user=%user.name email_client=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for suspicious email traffic
- rule: Suspicious Email Traffic
desc: Detect suspicious email-related network traffic
condition: >
(fd.sport in (25, 587, 993, 995)) and
(not fd.sip in (trusted_mail_servers))
output: >
Suspicious email traffic detected
(user=%user.name connection=%fd.name)
  • Email header analysis for spoofing indicators
  • URL analysis for malicious links
  • Attachment scanning for malware
  • Sender reputation checking
  • User behavior analysis for suspicious clicks
  • Email security solutions (SPF, DKIM, DMARC)
  • User training on phishing awareness
  • Web filtering for malicious URLs
  • Endpoint protection for malicious attachments

Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program.

# eBPF security rule for web application attacks
- rule: Web Application Attack
desc: Detect web application attack attempts
condition: >
(proc.name = "apache" or proc.name = "nginx" or proc.name = "httpd") and
(proc.cmdline contains "sql" or proc.cmdline contains "injection" or proc.cmdline contains "xss")
output: >
Web application attack detected
(user=%user.name web_server=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for suspicious HTTP requests
- rule: Suspicious HTTP Request
desc: Detect suspicious HTTP requests
condition: >
(fd.sport in (80, 443, 8080, 8443)) and
(proc.cmdline contains "sqlmap" or proc.cmdline contains "nikto" or proc.cmdline contains "nmap")
output: >
Suspicious HTTP request detected
(user=%user.name request=%proc.cmdline)
  • Web server logs analysis for attack patterns
  • SQL injection detection in database queries
  • XSS attempts in web applications
  • Directory traversal attempts
  • Authentication bypass attempts
  • Web application firewalls (WAF)
  • Regular security testing and patching
  • Input validation and sanitization
  • Secure coding practices

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries.

# eBPF security rule for PowerShell abuse
- rule: PowerShell Abuse
desc: Detect suspicious PowerShell usage
condition: >
(proc.name = "powershell" or proc.name = "pwsh") and
(proc.cmdline contains "-enc" or proc.cmdline contains "-e" or proc.cmdline contains "base64")
output: >
PowerShell abuse detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for script execution
- rule: Suspicious Script Execution
desc: Detect suspicious script execution
condition: >
(proc.name = "python" or proc.name = "perl" or proc.name = "ruby") and
(proc.cmdline contains "download" or proc.cmdline contains "execute" or proc.cmdline contains "payload")
output: >
Suspicious script execution detected
(user=%user.name script=%proc.cmdline)
  • Command line analysis for suspicious parameters
  • Script content analysis for malicious code
  • Process execution monitoring
  • Network connections from script execution
  • File system changes from script execution
  • Script execution policies and restrictions
  • Application whitelisting for interpreters
  • User training on script security
  • Endpoint detection and response (EDR)

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code.

# eBPF security rule for suspicious scheduled tasks
- rule: Suspicious Scheduled Task
desc: Detect creation of suspicious scheduled tasks
condition: >
(proc.name = "schtasks" or proc.name = "at" or proc.name = "crontab") and
(proc.cmdline contains "create" or proc.cmdline contains "add" or proc.cmdline contains "edit")
output: >
Suspicious scheduled task detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for suspicious cron jobs
- rule: Suspicious Cron Job
desc: Detect suspicious cron job creation
condition: >
(proc.name = "crontab" or proc.name = "cron") and
(proc.cmdline contains "suspicious_command" or proc.cmdline contains "malicious_script")
output: >
Suspicious cron job detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Scheduled task creation and modification
  • Cron job creation and modification
  • Task execution monitoring
  • Command analysis in scheduled tasks
  • User permissions for task creation
  • Scheduled task monitoring and auditing
  • User permissions for task scheduling
  • Task content validation and approval
  • Regular review of scheduled tasks

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon.

# eBPF security rule for autostart registry modifications
- rule: Autostart Registry Modification
desc: Detect modifications to autostart registry keys
condition: >
(reg.key contains "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run" or
reg.key contains "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run") and
(reg.type = "set" or reg.type = "create")
output: >
Autostart registry modification detected
(user=%user.name key=%reg.key value=%reg.value)
# eBPF security rule for startup folder modifications
- rule: Startup Folder Modification
desc: Detect modifications to startup folders
condition: >
(fd.name contains "Startup" or fd.name contains "startup") and
(proc.cmdline contains "copy" or proc.cmdline contains "move" or proc.cmdline contains "create")
output: >
Startup folder modification detected
(user=%user.name file=%fd.name)
  • Registry key modifications for autostart
  • Startup folder file additions
  • Service installation for autostart
  • Group Policy modifications
  • User profile modifications
  • Registry monitoring and protection
  • Startup folder monitoring and protection
  • Service management and monitoring
  • User profile protection

Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads.

# eBPF security rule for service creation
- rule: Service Creation
desc: Detect creation of suspicious services
condition: >
(proc.name = "sc" or proc.name = "net" or proc.name = "systemctl") and
(proc.cmdline contains "create" or proc.cmdline contains "install" or proc.cmdline contains "enable")
output: >
Service creation detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for suspicious process creation
- rule: Suspicious Process Creation
desc: Detect creation of suspicious processes
condition: >
(proc.name in (suspicious_processes)) and
(proc.cmdline contains "persistent" or proc.cmdline contains "autostart")
output: >
Suspicious process creation detected
(user=%user.name process=%proc.name)
  • Service creation and modification
  • Process creation monitoring
  • Service configuration analysis
  • User permissions for service creation
  • Service execution monitoring
  • Service management and monitoring
  • Process monitoring and protection
  • User permissions for service creation
  • Service configuration validation

T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Section titled “T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation”

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials or escalate privileges.

# eBPF security rule for privilege escalation attempts
- rule: Privilege Escalation Attempt
desc: Detect privilege escalation attempts
condition: >
(proc.name = "sudo" or proc.name = "su" or proc.name = "runas") and
(proc.cmdline contains "root" or proc.cmdline contains "administrator" or proc.cmdline contains "elevate")
output: >
Privilege escalation attempt detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for suspicious system calls
- rule: Suspicious System Call
desc: Detect suspicious system calls for privilege escalation
condition: >
(syscall.name = "setuid" or syscall.name = "setgid" or syscall.name = "setreuid") and
(proc.cmdline contains "escalate" or proc.cmdline contains "privilege")
output: >
Suspicious system call detected
(user=%user.name syscall=%syscall.name)
  • System call monitoring for privilege changes
  • Process execution with elevated privileges
  • User account changes and modifications
  • Service execution with system privileges
  • File system access with elevated privileges
  • Regular patching and vulnerability management
  • Privilege management and least privilege
  • System hardening and configuration
  • User account monitoring and protection

Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context.

# eBPF security rule for token manipulation
- rule: Token Manipulation
desc: Detect token manipulation activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "mimikatz" or proc.name = "sekurlsa" or proc.name = "wce") and
(proc.cmdline contains "token" or proc.cmdline contains "credential")
output: >
Token manipulation detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for process token changes
- rule: Process Token Change
desc: Detect process token changes
condition: >
(syscall.name = "setuid" or syscall.name = "setgid") and
(proc.cmdline contains "impersonate" or proc.cmdline contains "token")
output: >
Process token change detected
(user=%user.name syscall=%syscall.name)
  • Token manipulation tool usage
  • Process token changes and modifications
  • User impersonation attempts
  • Credential theft activities
  • System call monitoring for token operations
  • Token protection and monitoring
  • User account protection and monitoring
  • Credential management and protection
  • System hardening and configuration

Adversaries may disable or modify security tools to avoid detection.

# eBPF security rule for security tool tampering
- rule: Security Tool Tampering
desc: Detect tampering with security tools
condition: >
(proc.name in (security_tools) and proc.cmdline contains "stop") or
(proc.name in (security_tools) and proc.cmdline contains "disable") or
(proc.name in (security_tools) and proc.cmdline contains "uninstall")
output: >
Security tool tampering detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for log tampering
- rule: Log Tampering
desc: Detect log tampering activities
condition: >
(fd.name contains "/var/log" or fd.name contains "/var/audit") and
(proc.cmdline contains "rm" or proc.cmdline contains "truncate" or proc.cmdline contains "delete")
output: >
Log tampering detected
(user=%user.name file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Security tool status and configuration
  • Log file integrity and modification
  • Service status for security services
  • Configuration file modifications
  • User permissions for security tools
  • Security tool protection and monitoring
  • Log integrity monitoring and protection
  • Service protection and monitoring
  • Configuration management and monitoring

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate.

# eBPF security rule for file masquerading
- rule: File Masquerading
desc: Detect file masquerading activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "mv" or proc.name = "copy" or proc.name = "rename") and
(proc.cmdline contains "system" or proc.cmdline contains "windows" or proc.cmdline contains "update")
output: >
File masquerading detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for process masquerading
- rule: Process Masquerading
desc: Detect process masquerading activities
condition: >
(proc.name in (system_processes) and proc.cmdline contains "suspicious") or
(proc.name in (system_processes) and proc.cmdline contains "malicious")
output: >
Process masquerading detected
(user=%user.name process=%proc.name)
  • File name analysis for masquerading
  • Process name analysis for masquerading
  • File content analysis for legitimacy
  • Process behavior analysis for anomalies
  • System file integrity checking
  • File integrity monitoring and protection
  • Process monitoring and protection
  • System file protection and monitoring
  • User training on security awareness

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.

# eBPF security rule for brute force attacks
- rule: Brute Force Attack
desc: Detect brute force authentication attempts
condition: >
(proc.name = "ssh" or proc.name = "su" or proc.name = "login") and
(proc.cmdline contains "failed" or proc.cmdline contains "denied" or proc.cmdline contains "invalid")
output: >
Brute force attack detected
(user=%user.name attempts=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for multiple login attempts
- rule: Multiple Login Attempts
desc: Detect multiple failed login attempts
condition: >
(proc.name = "sshd" or proc.name = "login" or proc.name = "su") and
(proc.cmdline contains "authentication failure" or proc.cmdline contains "invalid user")
output: >
Multiple login attempts detected
(user=%user.name service=%proc.name)
  • Authentication failures counting and analysis
  • Login attempt patterns and timing
  • User account lockout monitoring
  • IP address analysis for attack sources
  • Service status monitoring for authentication services
  • Account lockout policies and monitoring
  • Rate limiting for authentication attempts
  • Multi-factor authentication implementation
  • Network monitoring and blocking

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.

# eBPF security rule for password store access
- rule: Password Store Access
desc: Detect access to password stores
condition: >
(proc.name = "keychain" or proc.name = "credential" or proc.name = "password") and
(proc.cmdline contains "dump" or proc.cmdline contains "extract" or proc.cmdline contains "export")
output: >
Password store access detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for credential theft
- rule: Credential Theft
desc: Detect credential theft activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "mimikatz" or proc.name = "sekurlsa" or proc.name = "wce") and
(proc.cmdline contains "credential" or proc.cmdline contains "password" or proc.cmdline contains "hash")
output: >
Credential theft detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
  • Password store access and modification
  • Credential extraction tool usage
  • User credential access patterns
  • File system access to credential stores
  • Network traffic analysis for credential theft
  • Credential management and protection
  • Password store protection and monitoring
  • User training on credential security
  • Endpoint protection for credential theft tools

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware.

# eBPF security rule for system enumeration
- rule: System Enumeration
desc: Detect system enumeration activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "whoami" or proc.name = "id" or proc.name = "uname") or
(proc.name = "ps" or proc.name = "top" or proc.name = "htop") or
(proc.name = "ls" or proc.name = "dir" or proc.name = "find")
output: >
System enumeration detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for system information gathering
- rule: System Information Gathering
desc: Detect system information gathering activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "systeminfo" or proc.name = "uname" or proc.name = "hostname") or
(proc.name = "ifconfig" or proc.name = "ip" or proc.name = "netstat")
output: >
System information gathering detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • System command execution monitoring
  • Information gathering tool usage
  • User behavior analysis for enumeration
  • System access patterns and timing
  • Network scanning activities
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • System hardening and configuration
  • Network segmentation and access controls
  • Security awareness training

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure.

# eBPF security rule for network scanning
- rule: Network Scanning
desc: Detect network scanning activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "nmap" or proc.name = "netstat" or proc.name = "ss") or
(proc.name = "ping" or proc.name = "traceroute" or proc.name = "telnet")
output: >
Network scanning detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for port scanning
- rule: Port Scanning
desc: Detect port scanning activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "nmap" or proc.name = "masscan" or proc.name = "zmap") and
(proc.cmdline contains "scan" or proc.cmdline contains "port" or proc.cmdline contains "host")
output: >
Port scanning detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Network scanning tool usage
  • Port scanning activities and patterns
  • Network traffic analysis for scanning
  • User permissions for network access
  • Scanning target analysis and monitoring
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis
  • Network segmentation and access controls
  • User permissions for network tools
  • Security awareness training

Adversaries may use remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network.

# eBPF security rule for remote access
- rule: Remote Access
desc: Detect remote access activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "ssh" or proc.name = "rdesktop" or proc.name = "vncviewer") or
(proc.name = "psexec" or proc.name = "wmic" or proc.name = "powershell")
output: >
Remote access detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for lateral movement
- rule: Lateral Movement
desc: Detect lateral movement activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "scp" or proc.name = "rsync" or proc.name = "ftp") and
(proc.cmdline contains "copy" or proc.cmdline contains "transfer" or proc.cmdline contains "move")
output: >
Lateral movement detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Remote access tool usage and patterns
  • Network connections for lateral movement
  • User authentication for remote services
  • File transfer activities and monitoring
  • Service access patterns and timing
  • Network segmentation and access controls
  • Multi-factor authentication for remote access
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis

T1550: Use Alternate Authentication Material

Section titled “T1550: Use Alternate Authentication Material”

Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens.

# eBPF security rule for credential reuse
- rule: Credential Reuse
desc: Detect credential reuse activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "mimikatz" or proc.name = "sekurlsa" or proc.name = "wce") and
(proc.cmdline contains "pass" or proc.cmdline contains "hash" or proc.cmdline contains "ticket")
output: >
Credential reuse detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for token theft
- rule: Token Theft
desc: Detect token theft activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "mimikatz" or proc.name = "sekurlsa" or proc.name = "wce") and
(proc.cmdline contains "token" or proc.cmdline contains "ticket" or proc.cmdline contains "credential")
output: >
Token theft detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
  • Credential reuse tool usage
  • Token theft activities and patterns
  • Authentication bypass attempts
  • User credential access and usage
  • Network traffic analysis for credential theft
  • Credential management and protection
  • Token protection and monitoring
  • User account protection and monitoring
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis

Adversaries may search local system sources to find files of interest.

# eBPF security rule for data collection
- rule: Data Collection
desc: Detect data collection activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "find" or proc.name = "grep" or proc.name = "search") or
(proc.name = "copy" or proc.name = "cp" or proc.name = "robocopy")
output: >
Data collection detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for file access
- rule: File Access
desc: Detect file access activities
condition: >
(fd.name contains "sensitive" or fd.name contains "confidential" or fd.name contains "secret") and
(proc.cmdline contains "read" or proc.cmdline contains "open" or proc.cmdline contains "access")
output: >
File access detected
(user=%user.name file=%fd.name)
  • File access patterns and monitoring
  • Data collection tool usage
  • Sensitive file access and monitoring
  • User permissions for file access
  • File system changes and modifications
  • File system monitoring and protection
  • Data classification and access controls
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • Data loss prevention solutions

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.

# eBPF security rule for network share access
- rule: Network Share Access
desc: Detect network share access activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "smbclient" or proc.name = "net" or proc.name = "mount") and
(proc.cmdline contains "share" or proc.cmdline contains "network" or proc.cmdline contains "remote")
output: >
Network share access detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for file transfer
- rule: File Transfer
desc: Detect file transfer activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "scp" or proc.name = "rsync" or proc.name = "ftp") and
(proc.cmdline contains "copy" or proc.cmdline contains "transfer" or proc.cmdline contains "download")
output: >
File transfer detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Network share access and monitoring
  • File transfer activities and patterns
  • User permissions for network access
  • Network traffic analysis for file transfers
  • Data access patterns and monitoring
  • Network segmentation and access controls
  • File system monitoring and protection
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • Data loss prevention solutions

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering.

# eBPF security rule for application layer protocol
- rule: Application Layer Protocol
desc: Detect application layer protocol usage
condition: >
(fd.sport in (80, 443, 53)) and
(proc.cmdline contains "curl" or proc.cmdline contains "wget" or proc.cmdline contains "nc")
output: >
Application layer protocol detected
(user=%user.name connection=%fd.name)
# eBPF security rule for DNS tunneling
- rule: DNS Tunneling
desc: Detect DNS tunneling activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "nslookup" or proc.name = "dig" or proc.name = "host") and
(proc.cmdline contains "suspicious_domain" or proc.cmdline contains "malicious_domain")
output: >
DNS tunneling detected
(user=%user.name domain=%proc.cmdline)
  • Network protocol analysis and monitoring
  • DNS traffic analysis for tunneling
  • Application layer protocol usage
  • Network traffic patterns and analysis
  • User behavior analysis for protocol usage
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis
  • DNS filtering and monitoring
  • Protocol analysis and monitoring
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate, external web service as a means for command and control.

# eBPF security rule for web service usage
- rule: Web Service Usage
desc: Detect web service usage for C2
condition: >
(proc.name = "curl" or proc.name = "wget" or proc.name = "python") and
(proc.cmdline contains "github" or proc.cmdline contains "dropbox" or proc.cmdline contains "onedrive")
output: >
Web service usage detected
(user=%user.name service=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for cloud service usage
- rule: Cloud Service Usage
desc: Detect cloud service usage for C2
condition: >
(proc.name = "aws" or proc.name = "gcloud" or proc.name = "azure") and
(proc.cmdline contains "upload" or proc.cmdline contains "download" or proc.cmdline contains "sync")
output: >
Cloud service usage detected
(user=%user.name service=%proc.cmdline)
  • Web service usage and monitoring
  • Cloud service access and monitoring
  • Network traffic analysis for C2
  • User behavior analysis for service usage
  • Service configuration and monitoring
  • Web service monitoring and filtering
  • Cloud service monitoring and access controls
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis

Adversaries may exfiltrate data in an automated manner without user interaction.

# eBPF security rule for automated transfer
- rule: Automated Transfer
desc: Detect automated data transfer
condition: >
(proc.name = "scp" or proc.name = "rsync" or proc.name = "ftp") and
(proc.cmdline contains "automated" or proc.cmdline contains "scheduled" or proc.cmdline contains "batch")
output: >
Automated transfer detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for scheduled transfer
- rule: Scheduled Transfer
desc: Detect scheduled data transfer
condition: >
(proc.name = "cron" or proc.name = "at" or proc.name = "schtasks") and
(proc.cmdline contains "transfer" or proc.cmdline contains "upload" or proc.cmdline contains "sync")
output: >
Scheduled transfer detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • Automated transfer tool usage
  • Scheduled transfer activities
  • Data transfer patterns and timing
  • Network traffic analysis for transfers
  • User behavior analysis for automation
  • Data loss prevention solutions
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • Automation monitoring and controls

T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Section titled “T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol”

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an alternative protocol.

# eBPF security rule for alternative protocol
- rule: Alternative Protocol
desc: Detect alternative protocol usage
condition: >
(fd.sport in (53, 123, 161)) and
(proc.cmdline contains "dns" or proc.cmdline contains "ntp" or proc.cmdline contains "snmp")
output: >
Alternative protocol detected
(user=%user.name protocol=%fd.sport)
# eBPF security rule for protocol abuse
- rule: Protocol Abuse
desc: Detect protocol abuse for exfiltration
condition: >
(proc.name = "nslookup" or proc.name = "dig" or proc.name = "snmpwalk") and
(proc.cmdline contains "exfiltrate" or proc.cmdline contains "steal" or proc.cmdline contains "data")
output: >
Protocol abuse detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
  • Alternative protocol usage and monitoring
  • Protocol abuse activities and patterns
  • Network traffic analysis for protocol usage
  • User behavior analysis for protocol usage
  • Service configuration and monitoring
  • Protocol monitoring and filtering
  • Network monitoring and traffic analysis
  • User monitoring and behavior analysis
  • Service configuration and monitoring

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network.

# eBPF security rule for data destruction
- rule: Data Destruction
desc: Detect data destruction activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "rm" or proc.name = "del" or proc.name = "format") and
(proc.cmdline contains "destroy" or proc.cmdline contains "delete" or proc.cmdline contains "wipe")
output: >
Data destruction detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
# eBPF security rule for file deletion
- rule: File Deletion
desc: Detect file deletion activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "rm" or proc.name = "del" or proc.name = "unlink") and
(proc.cmdline contains "large" or proc.cmdline contains "bulk" or proc.cmdline contains "mass")
output: >
File deletion detected
(user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline)
  • File deletion activities and patterns
  • Data destruction tool usage
  • File system changes and monitoring
  • User permissions for file deletion
  • System impact assessment and monitoring
  • Backup and recovery procedures
  • File system monitoring and protection
  • User permissions for file deletion
  • System monitoring and alerting

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network.

# eBPF security rule for encryption
- rule: Encryption
desc: Detect encryption activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "gpg" or proc.name = "openssl" or proc.name = "cryptsetup") and
(proc.cmdline contains "encrypt" or proc.cmdline contains "cipher" or proc.cmdline contains "crypto")
output: >
Encryption detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
# eBPF security rule for ransomware
- rule: Ransomware
desc: Detect ransomware activities
condition: >
(proc.name = "encrypt" or proc.name = "ransom" or proc.name = "crypto") and
(proc.cmdline contains "ransom" or proc.cmdline contains "encrypt" or proc.cmdline contains "lock")
output: >
Ransomware detected
(user=%user.name tool=%proc.name)
  • Encryption tool usage and monitoring
  • Ransomware activities and patterns
  • File system changes and monitoring
  • User behavior analysis for encryption
  • System impact assessment and monitoring
  • Backup and recovery procedures
  • File system monitoring and protection
  • User training on security awareness
  • System monitoring and alerting